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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
James A. Johnson and 
Jennifer L. Tohnson, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs . 
Nielsen & Senior, a Utah 
Corporation, and Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
A. DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and 
power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the 
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b): 
Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
rule, except that a statement of the issues or of the 
case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant. 
Case No. 930340 
900400460CN 
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B. ARGUMENT 
I. QUESTION OF JURISDICTION IS APPROPRIATE. 
It is not disputed by either party that an interlocutory 
appeal was entered by plaintiffs in 1992 (R at 647), nor that the 
Utah Supreme Court did not review the issues at that time. The 
question is whether a district court may proceed without having 
received notice of dismissal of an appeal, or whether jurisdiction 
remains with the appellate court until an order is sent to the 
district court. Article VIII Section 3 of the Utah Constitution 
provides as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and 
power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the 
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
The state Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
matters. This matter was before it, and the district court, until 
notified, could not have any control over a case which was 
presumptively still under the appellate court. It is therefore 
proper for this court to determine whether a district court, acting 
without notice of remand, has jurisdiction to act. This is a case 
of first impression in the State of Utah, and should be decided. 
II. APPELLEES RESPONSIVE BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
Appellees argument, in its brief, fail to cite to the record. 
This failure to cite is in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9) which provides in material part as follows: 
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An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on. 
U*-ah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b) incorporates the 
requirements with regard to appellants in the brief of the 
appellee. In Uckerman vs. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 
588 P. 2d 142 (Utah 1978), and in numerous other cases, the 
appellate courts of this state have refused to consider arguments 
unsupported by the record in the argument. The proper action to 
take where the record has not been cited to is to strike the 
argument and not consider it in the manner. This court should 
therefore strike the appellees' brief for its blatant refusal to 
conform to Rule 24, and only consider briefs of appellants because 
they conform with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. BY HIS OWN ADMISSIONS, PAT B. BRIAN ACTED IMPROPERLY. 
Defendant Pat B. Brian's own sworn testimony reveals his own 
incompetence in adoption matters. 'Addendum "A". 11/31/91 Pat B. 
Brian Deposition, attached and made a part herein, quote Defendant 
Brian's lack of legal knowledge in the handling of the adoptions). 
Brian did not think consent should be obtained prior to the 
delivery of the child, that the filing of a petition for adoption 
was necessary in this case, that telling Plaintiff Jennifer Johnson 
that the minor child could possibly be taken from her custody, nor 
that Defendant Brian did not think that Interstate Compact of 
Adoption applied in this case because the pregnant girl was not a 
resident of Texas. Where was the child born and abandoned? Texas. 
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Texas was therefore her state of residence with jurisdiction over 
any adoption. The doctors and hospital knew this was an adoption 
(they were paid the medical fees and they would not let anyone by 
the Birth Mother touch the baby while at the hospital). The 
pregnant girl knew this was for an adoption (she abandoned the baby 
in Dallas, after holding her and saying, "goodbye"). LeGene Lyman, 
who brought the baby to Utah, under the instructions of Defendant 
Brian, knew this was an adoption. See Deposition of LeGene Lyman. 
Defendant Pat B. Brian did nothing in Utah or Texas to secure a 
legal and binding release for the Johnsons (Addendum "B". Texas 
Interstate and Adoption Laws, attached hereto and made a part 
herein). At the Salt Lake International Airport, with the baby two 
days old, Defendant Brian delivered the baby to James and Jennifer 
Johnson and told them to take her and raise here as their own. 
LeGene Lyman, who transported the baby to Utah from Texas, 
later received a call from the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
inquiring if she had transported a baby into Utah on June 27, 1986. 
She was informed that Gary Sargent, the Natural Mother's attorney, 
had contacted the County Attorney's office with a complaint. In 
records of this court (Deposition of LeGene Lyman), she testified 
she did not know the pregnant girl well, she had not seen the 
adoptive parents but once or twice in the last 14 years, yet she 
felt the Birth Mother had freely and without pressure abandoned the 
baby. Mrs. Lyman wished Defendant Brian had contacted her while the 
Birth Mother lived in her Provo home for over two months after 
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birth.) See Addendum "Cff, excerpts from the Deposition of LeGene 
Lyman, October 18, 1991). This case is therefore meritorious. 
IV. APPELLEES HAVE MISCHARACTERIZED THE RECORD. 
The District Court cited two cases as precedent for his Rule 
41(b) Order dismissing Plaintiff's suit: Maxfield v, Rushton, 779 
P.2d 237 (Utah App.1989) for abuse of judicial process and Hill v. 
Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App.1992). 
Maxfield is clearly distinguishable from the one at bar. That 
court recited the following litany of acts which the Court found to 
constitute dilatory conduct of Plaintiffs in prosecuting that case: 
(1) Twice amending his complaint and attempting a third 
amendment. 
(2) Three Motions for Summary Judgment; 
(3) Filing for Bankruptcy; 
(4) Three trial dates set and Plaintiffs objections to all of 
them; 
(5) Three different lawyers, two withdrew for non payment of 
fees for services rendered; 
(6) Filed no certificate of readiness for trial; 
(7) Defendants had to file motions twice to compel Plaintiffs 
to respond to discovery. 
(8) Plaintiff there did not notify the Court that his 
bankruptcy case which was holding up the case was concluded. 
(9) Prejudice due to loss of witnesses memory in the nine 
years that case was pending. 
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(10) Plaintiff's property in that case had been assigned to 
a corporation in which he claimed to have no interest. 
Of the ten factors cited by Maxfield to justify a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal/most of them do not apply to the instant case. 
1. Complaint amendments. All amendments were amended within 
seventy days of filing. R at 218. 
2. No motions for complete summary judgment. 
3. Bankruptcy did not stay proceedings herein. 
4. Trial was continued due to a very late counterclaim (R at 
1490) and an interlocutory appeal (R at 1647) based upon a partial 
summary judgment (R at 1498 and 1616). 
5. Counsel herein did not withdraw for nonpayment. See 
Affidavit of Richard Coxson. 
6. Neither side submitted new certificates of readiness. 
7. Motion to Compel was filed by Plaintiffs (R at 699). 
8. Bankruptcy did not stay these proceedings. 
9. There has been no memory loss that defendants can point 
to. 
10. There has been no assignment of interest by plaintiffs. 
Maxfield weighs for plaintiffs, not defendants. 
Hil 1 has even less similarity to the instant case than 
Maxfield does. In Hil 1 the plaintiff filed a motion for continuance 
on the grounds that her expert witness (this was a dental 
malpractice suit) refused to testify and she proposed to hire one 
of "two other possible expert witnesses". This motion was made on 
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April 8, 1991 when the trial was set for two days later. The court 
granted that motion the day before the trial was set and ordered 
the parties to identify their expert witnesses within 10 days, set 
the trial for August 26,1991 and ordered discovery to be completed 
twenty days before the trial date. A mediation conference was 
scheduled for June 28, 1991, but the plaintiff in that case 
"refused to participate in that conference". On August 19, 1991, 
the plaintiff there served notice of a new expert witness. This was 
a violation of the scheduling order and (as Justice Orme only 
pointed out in his concurring opinion it also violated the "terms 
of counsels' stipulation"). In this case there has been no 
violation in scheduling orders or of any stipulations. 
It is significant that the Respondents have made no response 
to Appellants' claim (see P13) that appellate courts have 
traditionally shown a distaste for dismissals for failure to 
prosecute. The following excerpts from the cases heretofore cited 
on this point in order of citation are as follows: 
Case Name and Citation Comments and Quotes From 
1. Johnson vs. Firebrand, Inc. As to the lack of prosecution, 
571 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1977) it seems that neither party had 
any active interest in the 
matter for nearly four years. No 
reasons are given for the delay 
nor is any reason given for not 
entering the default of all 
defendants save that of David D. 
Bean who had answered. Since 
either party could have brought 
the matter to a conclusion it is 
difficult to see why the 
plaintiff should be denied his 
7 
claim to more than $38,000 
simply because counsel for 
plaintiff did not take a default 
judgment. Had he been present, 
counsel might have explained his 
tender feelings towards the 
defendants as to why he did not 
take a default judgment against 
them. 
Utah Oil Company v. Harris Turning now to the issue as to 
565 P.?d 1137 (Utah 1977) whether or not a lapse of 16 
months in prosecuting a claim 
for relief is sufficient to 
support a dismissal with 
prejudice, this court has been 
active in that area and has held 
that where all of the litigants 
had power to obtain relief and 
failed to do so, it is error to 
dismiss with prejudice. None of 
the defendants requested a re-
setting of either a pre-trial 
conference or trial as was' 
mandated by the court previously 
when the pre-trial was suspended 
by reason of settlement 
negotiations. 
Polk v, Ivers We conclude, after a review of 
561 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1977) the entire record in this 
matter, including the District 
Court's failure to notify the 
attorneys of the new trial 
date after the hearing on 
December 15, 1976, that it was 
an abuse of discretion to order 
a dismissal of this action for 
failure to prosecute when 
measured by the principles 
announced in Westinqhouse v. 
Larsen, supra 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. Since any party to this action 
Robbins, 335 P.2d 626 (Utah could have obtained the relief 
1959) to which it was entitled at any 
time it had wanted but both 
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parties chose to dally for a 
number of years, it was an abuse 
of discretion for the court to 
grant respondents' motion to 
dismiss with prejudice. 
V. MOTIONS FOR AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Respondents contend, and rightly so, that the partial summary 
judgment motion becomes moot if the ruling on Rule 41(b) is 
sustained. On the other hand if the Rule 41(b) ruling is reversed, 
then the summary judgment motion is critical in deciding whether 
the ensuing trial will determine whether any judgment based on 
liability will be relatively large or small. 
All cases that address summary judgments agree that such are 
sustainable only when there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material facts so that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. In the brief respondents concede liability (P23) 
but argue that the damages are relatively minor (suggesting only 
attorneys fees expense for the adoption and not even that since the 
defendant firm was willing to provide such services). They make no 
mention of the $10,000 referred to in the Court's Finding of Fact. 
There is therefore a genuine issue as the damages Appellants 
sustained. That issue alone requires a reversal if the partial 
summary judgment Rule 41(b) order is reversed in light of admission 
referred to above. 
Respondents have not challenged appellants assertation that 
the defendant Brian did not comply with Interstate Compact Adoption 
law (the original Judge of Record, Honorable Boyd Park instructed 
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Nielsen & Senior to comply with the Interstate Compact), or the 
implication that such constituted professional malpractice. 
The factual differences between the proposed Findings of Fact 
of Plaintiffs and Findings of Fact of Defendants are evident. 
1. The deposition of James Johnson was delayed and continued 
at the request and for the convenience of defendants. From the time 
that the deposition originally begun in November, 1990, numerous 
continuances were requested solely due to the dilatory and delaying 
tactics by defendants and agreed to by counsel for plaintiffs. 
Defendants further delayed this action by requesting a protective 
order and ahve sought to avoid begin deposed themselves. (Affidavit 
of Darwin Fisher, attached hereto). 
2. Only three (3) attorneys of record have entered 
appearance in this action, the court has ruled outside counsel 
irrelevant. (Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson, attached hereto). 
3. With regard to a scheduling conference held in Logan on 
July 12, 1991, the only meaningful resolution of issues which 
defendants attempted was to have the Complaint dismissed. Counsel 
for plaintiff was fully familiar with the case, and did not refuse 
to cooperate due to lack of familiarity (Affidavit of Darwin 
Fisher). 
4. Defendants never took the Deposition of Jennifer Johnson, 
although they relied upon the taking of her deposition as one of 
the grounds for delaying the taking of their own depositions. 
5. Defendant Brian refused to cooperate with the taking of 
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his deposition until October of 1991. His deposition, originally 
scheduled for a Saturday in October had to be rescheduled for 
November. It was further continued until December because he wished 
to attend a judicial conference in November. He further refused to 
have the deposition taken any day but Saturday. When the deposition 
was not completed on one day in November, it had to be continued 
until the following weekend. 
6. The court did not deny the Motion for Protective Order 
until December of 1991. This was only two months prior to trial. 
All depositions of Defendant Nielsen & Senior had to be taken after 
that time (R at 1700). 
7. In December, 1991, two (2) months before trial set for 
February 2-10, 1992, defendant Brian moved for permission to 
counterclaim against plaintiffs (R at 935). Defendant Brian had 
been a party to this action for eighteen months. Defendant's 
Brian's Motion for Counterclaim was granted in January, 1992 (R at 
1093). 
8. Defendants did not reveal the name of their expert until 
shortly before discovery cut off in January, 1992. Defendants 
refused to schedule a deposition until April, 1992, shortly before 
trial scheduled for May 5-14, 1992 (R at 1093). 
9. The May trial date was not stricken due to lack of 
preparation for trial, but due to the filing of an interlocutory 
appeal in April, 1992 (R at 1647). 
10. Counsel for Plaintiffs agreed with Defendant's Counsel to 
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set trial for November 2-13, 1992. The court failed to schedule 
trial, and so no trial was held in November, 1992 due to the 
court's own refusal to set trial (R at 2097). 
11. Contrary to the findings of the court, defendants have 
been dilatory, and have constantly sought to delay the completion 
of this action. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have completed all 
discovery that is necessary to go to trial, although there is more 
that could be conducted. 
There is attached, Addendum "D,f, which is the computer Docket 
statement of this case. Plaintiffs are ready for trial. As stated 
above, there are innumerable genuine issues of act in this case. 
Apparently no counsel of any party in their case requested 
that the telephone conference be recorded and it was not recorded. 
Appellants respectfully argue that the request of counsel was not 
an appropriate pre-requisite to it being recorded. The trial judge 
certainly had the means and authority to record it. Such recording 
would be all the more important in this type of case because of the 
"fact sensitive" nature of such cases. Due to the wide disparity 
between the proposed Findings of Fact and Order, a recording would 
be dispositive. 
This is a very sensitive case due to the fact that a major 
defendant is a sitting district court judge and the courts must 
ensure that Defendant Brian gets no special treatment. It is 
important not only for appellants but for public confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system. 
12 
C. CONCLUSION 
The district court, not having received remand from the 
appellate court, could not act. The dismissal should therefore be 
vacated. Appellees brief should be stricken for failure to cite to 
t^e record. Finally, this meritorious action should be allowed to 
be prosecuted in as much as the trial judge abused his discretion 
and appellees continue to mischaracterize the record and refuse to 
ecognize their own dilatory acts in this matter. 
DATED this ^ > d a y of j ^ ? hnrZOZ^-s , 1994. 
Tl I CHARB^fT COX SON 
Attorney for Appellants 
275 North Main 
PO Box 288 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid to: 
Arthur H, Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for Defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Hate Tower, Suite 1100 
Sal1- Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this zxyday of 2^< w 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant 
Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
_, 1994. 
RICHARD C. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD C. COXSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
RICHARD C. COXSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. My name is Richard C. Coxson. I reside in Spanish Fork, 
Utah County, Utah. I am an attorney of law in the State of Utah. I 
have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. I was a party to a telephonic hearing between Judge 
Christoffersen and attorneys for Defendants regard Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. The best of my recollection of that telephone 
conversation is that: 
a. The telephone call lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
b. There were no parts of any Deposition quoted or 
cited to Judge Christoffersen in this case. 
c. The Judge specifically stated that all acts prior to 
the filing of suit were not to be considered in the ruling, nor 
acts not a direct part of the litigation. 
3. I have never agreed, as stated in the Defendant's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, that the true names of the 
Plaintiffs be used in any part of this case. 
DATED this .^tjgy of /^A^jrllfi^^^ . 1994. 
RICHARD C. COXSON^^^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
cCX. The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this -*2JS -~ 
day of ]H^ h r i.v ^ r- ^\ , 19*9^, by Richard C. Coxson, who is 
personally known to me and who did take an oath. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires:-^ ^_o ^ c, 
DARWIN C. FISHER, Bar No. 1080 
HILL, HARRISON, HILL & FISHER 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Facsimile (801) 375-3865 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON AND 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ] 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ] 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C. FISHER 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
DARWIN C. FISHER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. 
All the statements hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made 
by me on the basis of my personal and direct knowledge of the 
matter to which said statements pertain. If called as a witness by 
a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as 
to each and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth 
in this Affidavit. 
2. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the 
State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years. 
3. It is not true that James Johnson requested continuances 
4m ?/rZ 
ST/ r 
R'OT COURT 
" «:TAh 
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of his Depositions once I became involved as his attorney. I do 
not recall an instance in which we requested Mr. Johnson's 
Deposition to be continued. All continuances of Mr. Johnson's 
Deposition was at the request of Nielsen & Senior or Judge Brian. 
4. After I began my representation of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, 
I was requested by the Defendants that they be allowed to complete 
the taking of Mr. Johnson's Deposition and Mrs. Johnson's 
Deposition before I began taking the Depositions of the Defendants. 
I agreed that we would not schedule the taking of the Depositions 
of the Defendants prior to the finishing of the taking of the 
Deposition of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson. It is quite clear that the 
Defendants never took Mrs. Johnson's Deposition and did request 
continuances for the taking of Mr. Johnson's Deposition. 
5. The Deposition of Defendant Pat Brian was set at Mr. 
Brian's request in the latter part of October or November 1991 
because Mr. Brian's Court schedule and Judicial Conference 
attendance did not allow him to be available for the taking of his 
Deposition prior to that time. When we approached the time for 
taking Mr. Brian's Deposition, Mr. Brian requested a continuance 
until December 1991. That continuance was discussed with the 
Honorable Judge Christoffersen by telephone with myself, Larry 
White and Michael Dowdle. It was represented that Mr. Brian could 
not be available on the date set for the taking of his Deposition 
and that it would have to be postponed. It was also discussed that 
if it were postponed that the Discovery cut-off date may be 
extended if additional time after the taking of his Deposition 
would be required for Plaintiff to complete Discovery. Thereafter, 
Mr. Brian did appear for the taking of his Deposition and it was 
necessary for the Deposition to be continued since we were not able 
to complete it in one day. Since Mr. Brian would only appear on a 
Saturday, his Deposition was continued for an approximate period of 
one week and we did not receive a copy of the transcript of his 
Deposition until January 1991. 
6. The Defendants' Deposition were scheduled, however the 
Defendants applied to the Court for a Protective Order. The 
Protective Order was not heard until the latter part of 1991 and 
the Depositions of the Defendants could not be taken until December 
1991. It is quite clear that the Defendants not only continued the 
taking of the Deposition of Mr. Johnson and then failed to take the 
Deposition of Mrs. Johnson, but also delayed the taking of the 
Depositions of the Defendants until the latter part of December 
1991. 
7. At a hearing in December 1991, Defendant Pat Brian first 
stated that he intended to file a Counterclaim. This was just a 
few months prior to the commencement of trial. Your affiant stated 
to the Court that it may be necessary for the trial date to be 
continued and additional time for Discovery be granted to the 
Plaintiff in order to prepare an adequate defense to the 
Counterclaim that was to be filed by Mr. Brian. Mr. Brian was 
granted leave of the Court to file a Counterclaim, which 
Counterclaim was filed in January 1991. Since trial was set for 
February 1991, it was necessary for the Plaintiff to have 
additional time in order to prepare adequately for the Counterclaim 
filed by Mr. Brian. 
8. In addition, the Court had granted Defendants Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgement. Plaintiff informed the Court that they 
would be filing a Interlocutory Appeal on the Judge's ruling for 
Partial Summary Judgement. That appeal was filed in approximately 
January 1991. 
9. After the filing of the Interlocutory appeal, the trial 
date was stricken. It was not until the Petition for Interlocutory 
appeal was denied that a new trial date was to be set. Counsel for 
Defendants, as well as counsel for Plaintiff in a telephone 
conversation agreed upon the date of November 2, 1992 for the trial 
date. However, your affiant checked with the Court approximately 
4-8 weeks prior to November 2, 1992 and found that the trial date 
had not been set. It was your affiant's understanding that the 
date of November 2, 1992 was to be given to the Honorable Judge 
Christoffersen who would then set the matter for trial in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in Provo, Utah. 
10. Your affiant strongly disagrees that the Defendant's were 
cooperative in Discovery and were attempting to move this case 
along. In fact, the opposite is true. The Defendants deliberately 
postponed the taking of the Depositions of the Defendants until the 
Discovery period had almost elapsed. Yet, Plaintiffs made 
themselves available for the taking of Depositions, their experts 
available for the taking of Depositions and their witnesses 
available for taking of Depositions as soon as your affiant became 
the attorney for the Plaintiffs. All of the delay in taking the 
Defendants Depositions was either at the request of the Defendants 
or by Defendants filing for a Protective Order. 
11. Your affiant did not object to the taking of the 
Deposition of the natural mother. Your affiant had set the taking 
of the Deposition of the natural mother for a day certain. The 
natural mother did not appear. Counsel for all parties agreed that 
the Deposition could be taken after the Discovery cut-off date/ 
however, your affiant determined after speaking with the natural 
mother that it would not be necessary for the Plaintiff to take the 
Deposition of the natural mother. Your affiant informed counsel 
for the Defendants that Plaintiffs would not be taking the 
Deposition of the natural mother. Defendants then noted for 
Deposition the testimony of the natural mother. Your affiant 
certainly could have argued that the taking of the natural mothers 
Deposition was beyond the Discovery cut-off date but did not. The 
Defendants, if they wished to have taken the Deposition of the 
natural mother could have done it on many occasions prior to the 
Discovery cut-off date but chose not to do so. 
12. In the telephonic hearing before the Court, you affiant 
only argued that the date the Defendants had set for the taking of 
the Deposition was a date on which you affiant could not appear and 
requested that another date be set. The Court allowed the 
Defendants to continue to the taking of the Deposition of the 
natural mother on the day that they had set upon the representation 
of counsel for the Defendants that they could not find any other 
date available prior to November 2, 1992 for the taking of natural 
mother's Deposition. Your affiant is certain the Court will recall 
that the attorneys for the Defendants argued that they could not 
get a date that was available to Nielsen & Senior and to Judge 
Brian prior to the November 1992 which was the date all parties 
believed to be the trial date. 
DATED this / 4? ^d~av of April, 1993. 
DARWIN CT FISHER 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On this ///7^-day of April, 1993, personally appeared before 
me DARWIN C. FISHER, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
S—NOTARY PUBLIC 
•.•DCF\COXSON.AFP 
MAILINGCERTIFICATE 
I fiereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59 and MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59, postage prepaid to: 
Arthur J. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this /U? day of (JJjQjV^^ _, 1993. 
QUOTATIONS FROM THE NOVEMBER 30, 1991 DEPOSITION OF 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Page 14 Lines 20-25 
(Question) Why was not a petition filed between the birth of the 
child and December, 86? 
(Answer) "I don't think it was necessary." 
(Question) Why didn't you feel it was necessary? 
(Answer) "I just don't think it was necessary." 
Page 58 Lines 20-21 
(Answer) "I don't think that consent is obtained prior to the 
delivery of the child (to the Johnsons)." 
Page 60 Lines 5-7 
(Answer) "Had I pressed Lizanne Engemann to give consent for 
the .adoption of the child at the time the baby was born there 
would have been no adoption in this case." 
Page 81 Lines 9-20 
(Question) Did you indicate to Jennifer at that time that the 
minor child could possibly to taken from their custody? 
(Answer) "No." 
(Question) What that a concern to you at that time? 
(Answer) "No." 
(Question) Why not? 
(Answer) "Because I was convinced after Lizanne Engemann had 
placed the child with LeGene Lyman in June of 1986 that if she 
were not contacted she would never make any effort to either see 
the child, have contact with the child, or assert any parental 
rights over the child." 
Page 43 Lines 8-24 
(Question) Did she ever specifically tell you that she had 
decided not to have her child adopted? 
(Answer) "No•" 
(Question) Did she ever specifically state to you that it was 
her intention not to give her consent to this adoption? 
(Answer) "No." 
(Question) Then I understand from what you are saying she 
mentioned she was uncertain as to what she may do? 
(Answer) "She stated repeatedly, particularly the last six 
weeks before the birth of the child, that she was uncertain about 
her plans and she stated that she had discussed her adoption with 
a number of people." 
(Pat Brian's 11/30/91 Deposition, Continued) 
(Page 43) 
(Question) What did you understand by her statement that she was 
uncertain concerning the adoption? 
(Answer) "I understood that she wanted more money or that she 
may renege on her adoption." 
Page 48 Lines 22-25 
(Answer) "Lizanne did not tell me outright that she was 
refusing to place the child with the Johnsons. Lizanne made a 
number of statements that suggested to mgshe wanted more money 
out of the adoption." 
Page 98 Lines 11-21 
(Question) From January '86 through June'86 did you ever discuss 
with LeGene Lyman your opinion that it would be best not to 
pressure the natural mother for her written consent to the 
adopt ion? 
(Answer) "I don't think so." 
(Question) Did you ever discuss with LeGene Lyman from June 1986 
to the date of the meeting in December 1986 between yourself and 
Chris and James Johnson, discuss with her your opinion that the 
natural mother should not be pressed for her written consent to 
the adoption? 
(Answer) "No." 
Page 85 Lines 14-22 
(Question) Did you attempt to gain her consent by asking her if 
she would sign a written consent to the adoption during that same 
time? 
(Answer) "No.M 
(Question) From June 1986 to December 1986 to the day of the 
meeting between yourself and Chris and James Johnson, did you 
attempt to obtain the consent of the natural mother? 
(Answer) "No." 
THE INTERSTATE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN Question: 
Texas Statute Chapter 45 45.021. Definitions 
(b) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer, or 
employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or 
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person. 
corporation, association, charitable agency, or other entity. 
located outside this state, which sends, brings, or causes to be 
sent or brought any child to another party state. 
Utah Statute 55-8B Definitions 
(2) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer, or 
employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or 
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person. 
corporation, association, Indian tribe, charitable agency, or 
other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought 
any child to another party state. 
Pat B. Brian qualified as the "sending agency" in both Texas and 
Utah. 
Pat Brian's Deposition, Page 17 Lines 8-16 
"I didn't think that the Interstate Compact had anything to do 
with the adoption." Why? "The birth mother was not a resident 
of the State of Texas." Any other reason? "She had given her 
consent (pre-birth consent) to the child being placed with the 
family in Utah." (Note, the pre-birth consent stated no state of 
the adopted family) "There was no agency involved. I suppose 
those are the reasons .'x 
Page 24 Lines 17-19 
(Question) Was Nielsen & Senior an adoption agency to your 
knowledge in January 1986? "They are a law firm." 
Why did Judge Boyd Park (4th District Court) instruct Chris 
Schmutz to comply with the Interstate Compact in January, 1987? 
(LeGene Lyman was contacted by the Utah County Attorney's office, 
inquiring because Gary Sargent had represented she had illegally 
brought the baby into Utah on June 27, 1986, violating the Utah 
Interstate Compact for Adoptions.) 
LeGene Lyman's Deposition, Page 42 Lines 2-8 
"...And I got worried that she was going to sue me for my part in 
that, for bringing the baby across the state line illegally, and 
which was a totally different side of her affections than what I 
had seen before." (Question) Who told you that she was 
thinking about bringing suit against you? "Gary Sargent." 
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H i s t o r i c a l a n d S t a t u t o r y N o t e s 
Prior Law: 
Acts 1975. 64ih I .eg. p. 2404. ch. 736. § 5. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.Sl. art. 695a-5. $ 5. 
L i b r a r y R e f e r e n c e s 
Charities «=»! I. 14. C.J.S. Adoption of Persons §§ 10 to 12. 
Infants «=>17. 19.4. C J.S. Charities §§ 13. 16. 
WLSTLAW Topic Nos. 75. 211. C.J.S. Infants §t» 8. 9. 
§ 45 .006 . Exemptions 
This subchapter does not apply to: 
(1) Ihe sending or bringing of a child into this state by his parent, 
stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or the 
child's guardian, and the leaving of the child with a person described in this 
subdivision or with a nonagency guardian in this state; or 
(2) the placement, sending, or bringing of a child into this state under the 
provisions of an interstate compact to which both Texas and the state from 
which the child is sent or brought are parlies. 
Acts 1979. 66 th Leg. , p . 2373 . c h . 842 . a r t . I, § I. cff. Sep t . 1. 1979. 
His tor i ca l a n d S ta tu tory N o t e s 
P r io r Law: 
Acts 1975. 64th Ixg.. p. 2404. ch. 736. § 6. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.Sl. art. 695a-5. § 6. 
C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Cliildien. see § 45.021. 
§ 45 .007 . Penalties 
(a) An individual or corporation that violates Subsection (a) or (c) of 
Section 45.002 of this code is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A child care facility in this state that violates Subsection (c) of Section 
45.002 of this code is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. On conviction, the 
court shall revoke any license to operate as a child-care facility or child care 
institution issued the facility by the department. 
Acts 1979. 66th Leg., p. 2373. ch. 842. art. 1. § 1. cff. Sept. I. 1979. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Pr io r Law: 
Acts 1975. 64th Leg., p 2404. ch. 736. § 7. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.Sl. art. 695a-5. § 7. 
C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s 
Class B misdemeanor punishment, see V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.22. 
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Ch. 45 
L i b r a r y R e f e r e n c e s 
Infants <£^20 
WISH.AW Topic No. 211. 
Ci S. Infants tj§ 9S. 100 to 107. 
[Sections 45.008 lo 45.020 reserved (or expansion] 
1 SUBCHAPTER 11. INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE / 
\- PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN / 
§ 45 .021 . Adoption of Compact; Text 
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is adopted by this 
state and entered into with all other jurisdictions joining therein in form 
substantially as follows: 
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 
ARTICLE L PURPOSE AND POLICY 
It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each other 
in the interstate placement of children to the end that: 
(a) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportu-
nity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions 
having appropriate qualifications and facilities lo provide a necessary and 
desirable degree and type of care. 
(b) The appropriate authorities in a stale where a child is to be placed 
may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed 
placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable require-
ments for the protection of the child. 
(c) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made 
may obtain the most complete information on the basis on which to 
evaluate a projected placement before it is made. 
(d) Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of children will 
be promoted. 
ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS 
As used in this compact: ^cS 
(a) "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject (ti£ 
to parental, guardianship, or similar control. . £ n/^" 
(b) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer, or employee thereof; a y ^ M ^ 
subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court c ' Vv ' * 
party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency, or 
entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to 
another party state. 
hereof; a \<fJt \ 
Durt of a A\«> ^ • 
or other V X 
child to V 
v 
(c) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is sent, brought, or w ^ 
caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private Vj 
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persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state oi local public 
authorities or for placement with private agencies or persons 
(d) "Placement" means the arrangement for the caic of a child in a 
family free or boarding home or in a child caring agency 01 institution but 
does not include any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally 
defective, or epileptic or any institution primanly educational in character, 
and any hospital or other medical facility 
ARTICLE III CONDITIONS FOR PLACEMENT 
(a) No(scnding agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into 
any other party state any chtfd /or placement in fosier caic or as a prelimi 
U V nary to a possible adoption(unless)the sending agency shall comply with each *3fc 
-*• and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of 0(* 
the receiving state governing the placement of children therein 
(b) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be sent or brought 
into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a 
possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public 
. authorities in the receivmgfetatc^vrittcn notice of the intention to send, bring. 
p ^ ^^orHplate lllf CTuld in the receiving state The notice shall contain 
C (1) the name, date, and place of birth of the child. X V j 
(2) the identity and address or addi esses of the parents or legal guardian, v^ vy ^ X» 
(3) the name and address of the person, agency, or institution to or with A ^ MJ- / A 
which the sending agency pioposcs to send, bring, or place the child, h o ,0* ^3 
(4) a full statement of the reasons for such proposed auion and evidence qj* ^\ 
of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made ^J^ 
(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving slate which is in receipt of a >-» 
notice pursuant lo Paragraph (b) of this article may icquest of the sending 
agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending 
agency's state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or 
additional information as it may deem necessary under the cucumstanccs to 
carry out the purpose and policy of this compact 
t>l (d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought 
\ V \ into the receiving state until the appropriate public authoiitics in the recciv 
i t»° ing state shall notify thcTscnding agency, in writing, to the cliccl that the 
vy proposed placement docs not appear to be contraiy to the interests of the 
J * 7 child 
^ ARTICLE IV PENALTY FOR II LEGAL PI ACEMLNT 
The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving 
state of a child in violation of the terms of this compact shall constitute a 
£ violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of both the state in 
r which the sending agency is located or from which it sends or brings the child 
a^v. and of the receiving state. Such violation may be punished or subjected to 
fYs sL penalty in cither jurisdiction in accordance with its laws In addition to 
^J^ liability for any such punishment oi penalty, any such violation shall consti 
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lute full and sufficient grounds foi the suspension or revocation of any 
litense. permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which A * *X-c^0^> 
cnipoucrs or allows it to place or caie for children ™ <>e/*c> * "V A 4 w J 
ARTICI L V RETENTION OF JURISDICTION^filfc ^ \f ^*£^J*+* °*^ 
(a) The sending agency shal^fctain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to (^ jyjJ****' 
IF. 
determine all maltcis in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment, fi^^f 4 f ^ > ^ ^ 
and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had L * ^ ~ ^ > V / A £ i - ^ 
remained in the sending agency's state, until ihe child is adopted, reaches ^ ^ J " " " " ^ 
majority, becomes self suppoi ting or is discharged with the concurrente of 
the appropuatc authority in the receiving state Such jurisdiction shall also 
include the power to effect oi cause the icturn of the child or its transfer to * 
another location and custody pursuant to law The sending agency shall ^ . i C A**^Y\ 
continue to have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the N w (jf^ 
child during the period of the placement Nothing contained herein shall Cj^i^S^T \X^\ ' 
defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving stale sufficient to deal with an act ^ nc/S^ 
of delinquency or crime committed therein f^ * 
(b) When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an 
agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state 
providing foi the performance of one or moic sci vices in respect of such case 
by the latter as agent for the sending agency 
(c) Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private chanta 
blc agency authorized to place childicn m the receiving state from performing 
services oi acting as agent in that state foi a piivate charitable agency of the 
sending state, nor to prevent the agency in the receiving state from dis 
charging financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of a child 
who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without relieving the 
responsibility set forth in Paragraph (a) hereof 
ARTICI E VI INSTITUTIONAL CARF OI Dl L1N0UENT CHILDREN 
A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in another 
party jurrsdiction pursuant lo this compact but no such placement shall be 
made unless the child is given a couit hearing on notice to the parent or 
guardian with oppoitunily to be heard, prior to his being sent to such other 
party jurisdiction for institutional caic and the court finds that. 
(1) equivalent facilities for the child aie not available in the sending 
agency's junsdiction, and 
(2) institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the 
child and will not pioducc undue hardship 
ARTICI E VII COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR 
The executive head of each junsdiction party to this compact shall designate 
an officci who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in 
his junsdiction and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party 
jurisdictions, shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry 
out nioie effectively the terms and provisions of this compact 
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lit determining questions of adoption, pri-
mary consideration is l**st interest of child. 
Hos ie r v. Brittain (Civ.App.1981) 612 
S.W.2d 636. 
3. Placement of child 
Adoption agency's placement of child 
with prospective adoptive parents did not 
legally vest an interest in prospective adop-
tive parents and disqualify all others from 
l>ctitioning for adoption. In Interest of Un-
named Child (Civ.App. 1979) 584 S.W.2d 476, 
ref. n.r.e. 
\. Age of adopting parties 
Petition for adoption of five-year-old de-
pendent and neglected child by husband and 
wife 62 and 45 years of age, respectively, 
was properly denied on ground that their 
age was too far advanced for the purpose 
of adoption. Davis v. Collins (1949) 147 T. 
418. 2 Hi S.W.2d 807. 
Question of whether adoptive parents 
who were fib' and 49 years of age respective-
ly at time of adoption were too old to l>e 
fiermitled to adopt an 8-year-old and a !'/-• 
-year-old child was a matter within discre-
tion of trial court. McGowen v. McGowen 
(Civ.App.1963) 364 S.W.2d 477. 
5. Grandparent* 
Fact that paternal grandparents were le-
gal s t rangers to child, although blood kin, 
did not disable them from petitioning for 
adoption of child. In Interest of Unnamed 
Child (Civ.App. 1979) 584 S.W.2d 476, ref. 
n.r.e. 
As legal relationship to child was not 
requirement for standing to petition for 
adoption, paternal grandparents had stand-
ing to petition for adoption of child. Id. 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
Title 2 
6. Guardian ad litem 
Individual had no standing to attack adop-
tion as necessary party to that suit by vir-
tue of his being guardian ad litem in prior 
parental rights termination proceeding. 
Durham v. Barrow (Sup.1980) 600 S.W.2d 
756. 
7. Foster parents 
Appellee foster parents had right to |>eti-
tion for adoption of child, and fact that such 
petition was given same cause number as 
appellant foster parents' petition and was 
filed in same court did not constitute im-
proj>er "intervention" by appellee foster 
parents. Rodriguez v. Miles (App. 13 Dist 
1983) 655 S.W.2d 245. 
8. Evidence 
Evidence, in adoption proceeding, did not 
warrant disallowance of adoption on theory 
that adoptive parents were morally or finan-
cially unfit. McGowen v. McGowen (Civ. 
App. 1963) 364 S.W.2d 477. 
Evidence, including investigators' report, 
upheld findings that grand|>arents were 
suitable and proper persons to adopt grand-
daughter whose adoption was opposed by 
the father. Wilson v. Morris (Civ.App. 1963) 
368 S.W.2d 711. 
Where Department of Human Resources 
actively opposed appellee foster parents' pe-
tition for adoption of child in favor of appel-
lant foster parents, trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in failing to order additional 
social study of appellee foster parents by 
Department, especially where additional 
study would only have been cumulative of 
all evidence adduced at trial as to appellee 
parents ' fitness. Rodriguez v. Miles (App. 
13 Dist. 1983) 655 S.W.2d 245. 
* 
§ 16.03. Prerequisites to Petition 
(a) If a petitioner is married, both spouses must join in the petition for 
adoption. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (c) of this section, no petition for 
adoption of a child may be considered unless there has been a decree 
terminating the parent-child relationship as to each living parent of the 
child or unless the termination proceeding is joined with the proceeding 
for adoption. 
(c) If a parent is presently the spouse of the petitioner, no termination 
decree is required with respect to the parental rights of that parent. 
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(d) If an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights contains a 
consent that the Texas Department of Human Services or an authorized 
agency may place the child for adoption and appoints the departmentor 
agency managing conservator of the child, no further consent by the 
parent is required and the adoption decree shall terminate all rights of 
the parent without further termination proceedings. 
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 1269, ch. 476, §§ 38 to 40, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; 
Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 2270, ch. 551, § 7, eff. Aug. 31, 1981; Acts 1985, 69th 
Leg., ch. 264, § 47, eff. Aug. 26, 1985. 
Historical Note 
The 1975 amendment in subsec. (b), sub-
stituted "Subsection (c)" for "Subsections 
(c), (d), and (e)" and added "or unless the 
termination proceeding is joined with the 
proceeding for adoption"; repealed former 
subsec. (d) which previously read: 
"If the child is not the legitimate child of 
its father and the mother is the spouse of 
the petitioner, the mother shall execute an 
affidavit in accordance with Section 15.04 of 
this code, and no termination decree is re-
quired with respect to the parental rights of 
the natural father. The affidavit must be 
attached to the petition.*'; 
and relettered former subsec. (e) as subsec. 
(d). 
The 1981 amendment in subsec. (d) substi-
tuted "Texas" for "Sta te" and "Human Re-
sources" for "Public Welfare". 
The 1985 amendment in subsec. (d) substi-
tuted "Services" for "Resources". 
Prior Law: 
Acts Jan. 16, 1850, p. 36. 
P.D. 30. 
Rev.Civ.St.1879, art. 1. 
Rev.Civ.St.1895, art. 1. 
Rev.Civ.St. 1911. art. 1. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 42. 
Acts 1931, 42nd Ix?g., p. 300. ch. 177, 
§§ 1, 6. 11. 
Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., p. 388, ch. 249, § 2. 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art . 46a, §§ 1, 6(d), 
(e). 
Cross Reference* 
Contents of affidavit, see § 15.03. 
Contents of |>etition, see § 11.08. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Annual survey of Texas law: Family Parent and child. 
law—Parent and child. Ellen K. Solender, 
34 Southwestern L.J. (Tex.) 159 (1980); 36 
Southwestern L J . (Tex.) 155 (1982). 
Texas Tech L.Rev. 
Eugene L. Smith, 8 
103 (1976). 
Adoption «=7 et seq., 11. 
CJ .S . Adoption of Persons 
76, 77, 87. 
Library References 
51 to 72*. 
In general 1 
Practice and procedure 
1. In general 
Joinder of husband and wife in |>etition 
by a married person for adoption of a minor 
Notes of Decisions 
child, written consent of living parents of 
child and sojourn of child for six months in 
petitioner's home were, by Vernon's Ann. 
Civ.St. art. 46a, §§ 1, 3 and 6 (repealed; 
see, now, §§ 11.04, 11.08. 15.02. 15.03, 16.-
01, 16.02, 16.04, 16.05 and this section), 
made prerequisites to adoption. Smith v. 
Curtis (Civ.App.1949) 223 S.W.2d 712. 
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Mthough alleg itions of rice of parties 
prtstnt iddress birthd ite ind birthplace of 
the minors were requisites of adoption peti 
tion and should be proved such allegations 
utrt not jurisdictional and tould be waived 
Wo< d ill v Schmudlach (( iv App 19 )7) 299 
S W M 780 
Where adoption petition by stepfather 
illentd that natural father had failed to pay 
child support provided for b> divorce decree 
for |* nod of six vears and petition alleged 
consent of juvenile judge of county court to 
adoption by step father petition was suffi 
ci* nt to confer jurisdiction on trial court to 
grant adoption Id 
Where married person is petitioning for 
an adoption joinder of such person s spouse 
in the |>etition for adoption is jurisdictional 
t.ircia v I)e Ennquez (Civ App 19o8) 313 
SW2d 918 
Where petition for adoption showed that 
adopting husband and wife joined in the 
jKtition fact if true that they were not 
married at time of |>etition would at most 
make judgment of adoption voidable not 
void id 
That both parents of minor child were 
deceased and that there was no exception to 
requirement of Vernon s Ann Civ St art 
4f»a § la (regaled see now § 1108) that 
IxUh | arents consented to adoption which 
would cover such situation did not preclude 
adoption of child by grandp irents Retha 
her v Kallmann (Civ App 1968) 4 U S W 2d 
721 
Wheie there was a decree terminating 
the pan nt-<hi!d relitioiiship as to the moth 
er of child and her husband at time of 
child s birth and at time of petition for 
adoption petitioner had not established that 
he w is biological fathi r of child subsec (b) 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
Title 2 
of this section providing that no petition for 
adoption of child could be considered unless 
there had been a decree terminating parent 
child relationship as to each living parent of 
child did not preclude consideration of peti 
tion for adoption by person asserting that 
he was the biological father of child Fur 
low v Harns County Child Welfare Unit 
(Civ App 1975) 527 S W 2d 802 
Word parent when it appears in Family 
Code relating to eligibility for adoption of 
child must be presumed to mean a parent 
recognized as such under law of Texas Id 
Where juvenile court entered decree of 
adoption before pnor judgment terminating 
parent-child relationship had become final 
adoption decree was void and its entry did 
not moot pending appeal of termination pro 
ceedings Schiesser v State (Sup 1976) 544 
S W 2 d ttl 
If parental rights termination judgment 
was valid two minors natural mother had 
no standing to bring bill of review as party 
to subsequent adoption but if termination 
decree was invalid then natural mother was 
necessary party to an> adoption and she 
was entitled to notice of adoption suit and 
she would then have standing to attack 
adoption by bill of review Durham v Bar 
row (Sup 1980) 600 S W 2d 7% 
I Practice and procedure 
Since natural parent s standing to attack 
adoption would require favorable judgment 
on attack of prior parental rights termi 
nation decree separate trials of these two 
matters would be desirable with bill of re 
view against termination decree tried 
Durham v Earrow (Sun 1980) 600 
? r . f i • 
1 of re j 
§ 16.031. Social Study Time for Hearing 
(a) In a suit affecting the parent child relationship in which an adop 
tion is sought the court shall order the making of a social study as 
provided in Section 11 12 of this code and shall set a date for its filing 
(b) The court shall set the date for the hearing on the adoption at a 
time not later than 60 days, nor earlier than 40 days, after the date on 
which the investigator is appointed For good cause shown, the court 
may set the hearing at any time that provides adequate time for filing 
the report of the study 
Added by Acts 1975 64th Leg p 12b9 ch 476 § 41 
">12 
eff Sept 1 1975 
^ 0 ft*' ^ 
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I^ aw Review Commentaries 
Annual survey of Texas law Termination len K Solender 35 Southwestern L J (Tex) 
of parental relationship and adoption El 171 (1981) 
Library References 
Adoption ^=13 
C J S Adoption of Persons §§ 49 50 88 
to 97 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 
Hearing 2 
1 In general 
Only those portions of social study re 
ports prepared by independent investigator 
which are admissible under rules of evi 
dence may be disclosed to jury in adoption 
proceeding Green v Remling (Sup 1980) 
608 S W 2d 90S on remand 610 S W 2d 817 
This section and § 11 12 providing for 
preparation of social studies in suits affect 
mg parent-child relationship constitute leg 
islative recognition of suitability of modified 
proceedings in cases dealing with parent 
child relationship however even with such 
modified procedure parUes cannot be de 
prived of usual attributes of fair trial in 
open court Id 
Legislature intended that trial court in 
adoption proceeding could consider social 
study prepared by independent investigator 
and could use its discretion in determining 
weight to be given to such study when it 
has been ordered and filed and is contained 
in record even if re|>ort has not been for 
mally admitted into ev idence by one of par 
ties as an exhibit Id 
Inclusion of social study report prepared 
by independent investigator in record of 
adoption proceeding makes it unnecessary 
to formally introduce report into evidence 
Id 
Where Department of Human Resources 
actively opposed apf>ellee foster parents pe-
tition for adoption of child in favor of appel 
lant foster parents trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in failing to order additional 
social study of appellee foster parents by 
Department especially where addiUonal 
study would only have been cumulative of 
all evidence adduced at trial as to appellee 
parents fitness Rodriguez v Miles (App 
H Distl983) 6 5 5 S W 2 d 245 
Jefferson County may place in the special 
fund established by § 54 061 the funds it 
receives from the Texas Youth Council pur 
suant to V T C A Human Resources Code 
§ 61 083 and those it receives for conduct 
ing social studies pursuant to this section 
Op Atty Gen 1983 No MW-523 
2 Hearing 
Though there was nothing in record to 
indicate that trial court found or showed 
good cause for holding hearing on adopUon 
petition more than 60 days after an investi 
gator was appointed where no substantive 
right or benefit was impaired reversible 
error by reason of mere failure to comply 
with technical procedural requirements of 
subsec (b) of this section did not occur 
Remling v Green (Civ App 1980) 610 S W 2d 
817 
§ 16.032. Health, Social, Educational, and Genetic History Report 
(a) Before placing a child for adoption with any person other than the 
child s* stepparent grandparent aunt or uncle by birth, marriage, or 
prior adoption the Texas Department of Human Services, an authorized 
agency or the child s parent or guardian shall compile a report on the 
a\ailable health, social, educational, and genetic history of the child to be 
adopted If the child has been placed for adoption by any person or 
entity other than the department an authorized agency or the child's 
parent or guardian, it is the duty qfJiie person or entity who places the 
qhild for adoption to prepare the freport} " 
^16 .032 PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
* Title 2 
(b) The health histon of the child must include information about the 
child's health status at the time of placement The health history must 
include birth neonatal and other medical, psychological psychiatric, and 
dental history a record of immunizations, and the available results of 
medical psychological, psychiatric, and dental examinations of the child 
(c) The social history of the child must include information, to the 
extent known about past and existing relationships among the child, his 
siblings, his parents b> birth, his extended family, and other persons who 
have had physical possession of or legal access to the child 
(d) The educational history of the child shall include, to the extent 
known information about the enrollment and performance of the child in 
educational institutions, results of educational testing and standardized 
tests and special educational needs, if any, of the child 
(c) The genetic history of the child shall include a description of the 
child's parents by birth and their parents, and shall specifically include, 
to the extent such information is available, information about 
(1) their health and medical history, 
(2) their health status at the time of placement, 
(1) the cause of and their age at death, 
(4) their height and weight and eye and hair color, 
(5) their nationality and ethnic backgrounds, 
((>) their general levels of educational and professional achieve 
menLs if any, 
J* (7) their religious backgrounds, if any, and 
J (8) the existence of any other child or children born to either of the 
\ ^ child's parents by birth prior to placement of the child for adoption 
v. (f) The department, authorized agency, parent, guardian, or person or 
>* entity who places the child for adoption shall, at or before the time of 
%S placement provide the adoptive parents with a summary of the report 
^ edited to protect the confidentiality of birth parents and their families 
^ 3 (g) The report and a copy of the report summary submitted to the 
ff child s adoptive parents shall be retained for a period of 99 years by the 
department or authorized agency placing the child for adoption If the 
agency ceases to function as an authorized agency, the agency shall 
transfer all the reports to the department or, after giving notice to the 
department, to a transferee agency that is assuming responsibility for 
the preservation of the agency's adoption records If the child has not 
been placed for adoption by the department or an authorized agency, and 
if the child is being adopted by a person other than the child's steppar 
ent grandparent aunt or uncle by birth, marriage, or prior adoption, the 
person or entity who places the child for adoption shall file the report 
and a copy of the report summary submitted to the child's adoptive 
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parents with the department, which shall retain buth copies for a period 
of 99 years - V * 
(h) No petition for adoption of a child by a person other than the \ J * ^ 
child's stepparent, grandparent, aunt, or uncle by birth, marriage, or ^ v 
prior adoption may be granted until a copy of the report summary \* 
submitted to the child's adoptive parents has been filed in the record of 
the suit 
(i) The department authorized agency, or court retaining a copy of the 
report summary submitted to the adoptive parents shall provide a copy ^ \ 
of that summary to the following persons on request j ^ 
<fA 
M 
(1) an adoptive parent of the adopted child, 
(2) the managing conservator, guardian of the person, or legal 
custodian of the adopted child, 
(3) the adopted child, after he is an adult, Ci v A* ^ 
(4) the surviving spouse of the adopted child if the adopted child is 
dead and the spouse is the parent or guardian of a child of the 
deceased adopted child, or 
(5) a progeny of the adopted child if the adopted child is dead and 
the progeny is an adult 
(j) A copy of the report summary may not be furnished to any person 
who cannot furnish satisfactory proof of his identity and of his legal 
entitlement to receive a copy of the summary 
(k) A person requesting a copy of the report summary must pay the 
actual and reasonable costs of providing a copy of the summary and 
verifying his entitlement to the copy 
(/) The department, authorized agency, parent, guardian, person, or 
entity who prepares and files the original report and summary is re 
quired to furnish supplemental medical information to the adoptive 
parents should it become available, and to file such supplemental infor 
mation where the original report and summary are filed, where it shall 
be retained for as long as the original report and summary are required 
to be retained 
Added by Acts 1983 68th Leg p 1782 ch*342 § 4 eff Jan 1 1984 Amended 
by Acts 1985 69th Leg ch 264 § 48 ef f A u g 26, 1985 
Hifttoriral Note 
Section 8 of the 1*M3 Act provides copy of the summary report must be filed 
if the court finds that the making or filing 
A court having on the effective daU of
 o f t n e ^ ^ ,g n o t feasiD|e o r w o u | d c a u s e 
this Act jurisdiction of a suit affecting the
 a n i n . u s t l c e 
parent child relationship in which an adop-
tion is sought ma\ waive the requirement The 198r> amendment in subsec (a) substi 
under Section 16 0J2 Famil> Code that a tuttd Services for Resources 
r>15 
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§ 15.022 I'AltKNT-CIIIM) RELATIONSHIP 
Title 2 
§ 15.022. Termination After Abortion 
(a) A petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship 
with res|>ect to a parent who is not the petitioner may be granted if the 
child was born alive as the result of an abortion. 
(b) In this code, "abortion" means an intentional expulsion of a human 
fetus from the body of a woman induced by any means for the purpose 
of causing the death of the fetus. 
(c) The court or the jury may not terminate the parent-child relation-
ship under this section with respect to a parent who: 
(1) had no knowledge of the abortion; or 
(2) participated in or consented to the abortion for the sole purpose 
of preventing the death of the mother. 
Added by Acts 1079, 66th I>eg., p. 1102, ch. 5K0. § 2, off. June 13. 197". 
Cross References 
Care, control, anil custody of living child after abortion, sec § 17.011. 
ItijrhtK of living child after an ahortion or premature birth, see § 12.05. 
I*aw Review Commentar ies 
Altortion law: Consent requirements and Annual survey of Texas law: Family 
s|iecial statutes. Terry (>. Tottenham. Dan law—Parent and child. Kllen K. Solendcr. 
M. Peterson and Marsha L Rcintfcn. IK
 :{4 Southwestern K..I. (Trx.l l.~>» <I!IXU). 
Houston LRev. K|!l (l'JHl). 
§ 15.03. Affidavit of Relinquishment of Parental Rights 
(a) An affidavit for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights must 
be signed after the birth of the child by the parent, whether or not a 
minor, whose parental rights are to be relinquished, witnessed by two 
credible persons, and verified before any person authorized to take oaths. 
(b) The affidavit must contain: 
(1) the name, address, and age of the parent whose parental rights 
are being relinquished; 
(2) the name, age, and birthdate of the child; 
(3) the names and addresses of the guardians of the person and 
estate of the child, if any; 
(4) a statement that the affiant is or is not presently obligated by 
court order to make payments for the support of the child; 
(f>) a full description and statement of value of all property owned or 
{assessed by the child; 
(6) allegations that termination of the parent-child relationship is in 
the best interest of the child; 
(7) one of the following, as applicable: 
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(A) the name and address of the other parent; 
(B) a statement that the parental rights of the other parent have 
been terminated by death or court order; or 
(C) a statement that the child is not the legitimate child of the 
father and that an affidavit of status of child has been executed as 
provided by Section 15.04 of this code; 
(8) a statement that the parent has been informed of his parental 
rights, powers, duties, and privileges; and 
(9) a statement that the relinquishment is revocable, or that the 
relinquishment is irrevocable, or that the relinquishment is irrevocable 
for a stated period of time. 
(c) The affidavit may contain: 
(1) a designation of any qualified person, the Texas Department of 
Human Services, or any authorized agency as managing conservator 
of the child; 
(2) a waiver of process in a suit to terminate the parent-child 
relationship brought under Section 15.02(1)(K) of this code, or in a suit 
to terminate joined with a petition for adoption under Section 16.03(b) 
of this code; and 
(3) a consent to the placement of the child for adoption by the Texas 
Department of Human Services or by an agency authorized by the 
Texas Department of Human Services to place children for adoption. 
U\) An affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights which designates 
as the managing conservator of the child the Texas Department of 
Human Services or an agency authorized by the Texas Department of 
Human Services to place children for adoption is irrevocable. Any other 
affidavit of relinquishment is revocable unless it expressly provides that 
it is irrevocable for a stated period of time not to exceed 60 days after 
the date of its execution. 
Amended hv Acts 1075, 64th Leg. , p. 1267, ch. 476, § 33 , eff. Sept . 1, 1975; Ac t s 
19X1. 67th !<eg.. p . 2270, eh. 551 , § 6. eff. A u g . 3 1 , 1981; Ac t s 1985, 69th Leg. , 
ch. 264. § 45. eff. A u g . 26, 1085. 
Historical Note 
The I'.l7."i amendment in suhsec. (a) insert- The 1JIK5 amendment substituted "Servic-
ed "after the birth of the child" and substi- e s" for "Resources" in subd. (cKU. in two 
tilled "verified" for "acknowledged" and. in i instances in subd. (cK-0. and in two inxlanc-
SUIMI. <cK2). substituted " 15.02< 1X K)" for es in suhsec. (d). 
"Vt.tmmir and "HitKUbr for " lo.n:«cf 
and deleted ". for the |>criod during which Prior |»aw: 
the affidavit is irrevocable" preceding ": AcU 1JWI. 42nd IA»K., p. MOO, oh. 177. § 6. 
and". Acts 1!W7. 45lh U-jr., p. 1324. ch. 4«M>. § 1. 
The l!»X| amendment in suUls. (cHD and Act* 11)51. f,2nd 1*%.. p. MH. ch. 24». § 2. 
(cM.ll and in two places in the first sentence Acts l'Mil, 57th h-jr p. 7.T7, ch. M44, § 1. 
of MIIIMT. <d) substituted "Texas" for Acts HM',.!. f»Xth b K p U41. ch. 370. § 1. 
"Sta te" and "Human Resources" for "Pub- Acts Ii»u7. liflLh Ufi.. p. IXI'I, ch. 700. § U. 
lie Welfare". Vernon's Ami.Civ.St. a r t 4na. § <Kf). 
477 
§ 15.04 PARENT-CHILI) RELATIONSHIP 
Title 2 
(b) The affidavit must state: 
(1) that the mother is not and has not been married to the father of 
the child; 
(2) that the mother and father have not attempted to marry under 
the laws of this state or another state or nation; 
(3) that paternity has not been established under the laws of any 
state or nation; and 
(4) one of the following, as applicable: 
(A) the father is unknown and no probable father is known; 
(B) the name of the father, but the affiant does not know the 
whereabouts of the father; 
(C) the father has executed a statement of paternity under Section 
13.22 of this code and an affidavit of relinquishment of parental 
rights under Section 15.03 of this code and both affidavits have been 
filed with the court; 
(D) the name and whereabouts of the father; or 
(E) the name of any probable father of the child. 
(c) The affidavit of status of child may be executed at any time after 
the first trimester of the pregnancy of the mother. 
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 1268, ch. 476, § 34, eff. Sept 1, 1975. 
Historical Note 
The 11)75 amendment in subsec. (a) delet- to (3), in war. (4MA), added "and no probable 
ed "subsequent U> the birth of the child." father is known", inserted "the name of the 
after "whether or not a minor," and substi- father, but" in par. (4KB), substituted "Sec-
luted "yenned" for "acknowledged"; in
 t i o n n t r f o r "Section 13.02" in par. (4XC). 
Rubsec. (b) deleted that after The affida- „J„I^I . .„. i*uv\. - - J ..i.i«,t -!.i «,^. i~\ 
..:» _ • • • • • : » J ««»u 4» • i i n t added par. (4Kb); and aoden Rubsec. (c). 
vitmuRtKlate , inserted that in Hubds. (1) K 
Croaa References 
Adoption, execution of affidavit under this section, see § 16.03(d). 
Law Review Commentaries 
Parent and child. Eugene L. Smith, 8 
Texas Tech L.Hev. 99 (1976). 
Library References 
Children Out-of-Wedlock *=12. CJ.S. Parent and Child §§ 2 to 4. 10. 
Infants *»15T,. Tex. Prac., Juvenile Lmw and Practice, ch. 
Parent and Child «=»l. 64 
CJ.S. Bastards 5 11. 
CJ.S. Infants §§ 31, 36 to 40, 43, 44. 51, 
52, 55, 62. 
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§ 15.041. Affidavit of Waiver of Interest in Child 
(a) A person may execute an affidavit disclaiming any interest in a 
child and waiving notice or the service of citation in any suit to be filed 
affecting the parent-child relationship with respect to the child. 
(b) The affidavit shall be signed by the person, whether or not a minor, 
witnessed by two credible persons, and verified before a person autho-
rized to take oaths. The affidavit may be executed before the birth of 
the child. 
(c) The affidavit may contain a statement that the affiant does not 
admit being the father of the child or having had a sexual relationship 
with the mother of the child. 
(d) An affidavit of waiver of interest in a child may be used in any 
proceeding in which the affiant attempts to establish an interest in the 
child. The affidavit may not be used in any proceeding brought by 
another person to establish the affiant's paternity of the child. 
(e) In a suit to adopt a child or in a suit brought by the Texas 
Department of Human Services or an authorized agency for the purpose 
of terminating all legal relationships and rights which exist or may exist 
between the child's parents and the child, the court may render a decree 
terminating all legal relationships and rights which exist or may exist 
between a child and a man who has executed an affidavit of waiver of 
interest in the child, including the right to seek voluntary legitimation of 
the child, if the court finds that rendition of the decree is in the best 
interest of the child. 
Added hv Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 1268, ch. 476, § 35, eff. Sept. 1, 1975. 
Amended* by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 2360, ch. 582, § 1, eff. Sept 1, 1981; Acta 
1985, 69th Leg., ch. 264, § 46, eff. Aug. 26, 1985. 
Historical Note 
The 19K1 amendment added subsec. (c). 
The 1985 amendment in subsec. (c) substi-
tuted "Services" for "Resources". 
Cross References 
Citation and notice to alleged or probable father, affidavit of waiver under this section, see 
§ 11.09(a)(8). ' 
Guardian ad litem, ap|>ointment, exception where affidavit of waiver of interest executed, 
see § ll.HXb). 
l>aw Review Commentaries 
Annual survey of Texas law: Family Parent and child. Eugene L Smith, 8 
law—Parent and child. Ellen K. Solender. Texas Tech LRev. 100 (1976). 
36 Southwestern L.J. (Tex.) 155 (11)82). 
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LEGENE LYMAN'S DEPOSITION, TALKING ABOUT LIZANNE ENGEMANN AND HER 
SITUATION AT THE TIME SHE WANTED THE BABY BACK (June, 1987) 
The Callihans (San Diego, California) bankrolled Lizanne's and 
their filing the Habeas Corpus, which was signed by Judge Ball if, 
4th District Court. She was going to be their future daughter-
in-law and this was going to be their granddaughter. 
Page 52 Lines 9-20 
"From Lizanne. When she was up here on—when she came up to see 
him (Elder Scott Callihan) off at the Language Training Mission 
she was staying with her family at her own home and she told me 
that she would go pick him up at 2:00 a.m. in the morning at the 
Language Training Mission and that he would sneak out the window 
and they would go up to the canyon and have sex. She told me 
that herself. And I felt some concerns there. And she told me 
that the Callihans would allow her to spend hours in his bedroom 
and never even check up on them, and that they didn't seem to 
really care. And I felt some concerns here if there is a young 
man going on a mission." 
Page 53 Lines 15-25+ 
"And he (Richard Callihan, the father) told me that it wasn't 
necessary for me to bear my testimony and that he thought that I 
was typical of the problems that Lizanne had with her parents. 
He said that we are Utah Mormons who, so to speak, lay a guilt 
trip on a young girl like this, And thanks for bearing my 
testimony, but that he didn't need it. He was very caustic 
toward me. And he said that that's what the courts are for, the 
attorneys are for, is to decide who should have the baby, and 
that they were going to change the venue out to California 
because of the Mormon court system up here. He didn't feel that 
anybody would give them a fair judgment." 
Page 86 Lines 8-14 
"...She called up there (Nielsen & Senior, May 30, 1987) to see 
if there was some way she could sign the papers before she went 
back to California. And the reason she wanted to do it at that 
time—she expressed to us at that time that she had not informed 
her new in-laws (Callihans) that she had given birth to a baby 
and she was concerned about informing that and what—them of that 
and that it would be a surprise to them." 
(Chris Schmutz had never conversed, nor corresponded with Lizanne 
until June 8, 1987, even though he was in the case since 
December, 1986 and doing all the work. On May 30, 1986, when 
Lizanne called up to Nielsen & Senior to sign the papers, the 
only person she asked for was Pat Brian.) 
Page 89 Lines 13-17 
(Question) Excuse me, Counsel. I guess I'm a little confused. 
Are we talking about Mr. Schmutz here or Mr. Brian when you said 
that she was told that he was regional rep and was out of town? 
"Pat Brian." 
LEGENE LYMAN'S CONCLUSION ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF PAT B. BRIAN IN 
THIS ADOPTION MATTER, 
Page 167 Lines 9-23 
"I thought there had been some negligence when I talked to Murray 
Payne, who had been one of the heads of social services on 
adoptions. And I called him and asked him, How can this happen? 
And he told me that legal papers should have been signed in the 
office on the first day, and that if those papers had been legal 
that this would never have happened, that this was a negligent 
thing." (emphasis added) 
(Question) He is the one that used the word "negligent"? "Yes." 
(Question) And as far as you are concerned, at all times when 
you were involved there was pressure being put on Lizanne to sign 
the documents after the birth? "No, because there was no 
one really contacting her. And I didn't expect them to contact 
her until after December." (her misunderstanding about adoptions, 
because of her own daughter) "Things were very, very quiet." 
Page 170 Lines 22-25 
"I could have done that, yes." (finalize the adoption) 
"But you'll have to realize that I felt that there was some 
neglect here—me not knowing the law—I felt that it—I still 
feel that it should have been taken care of within the first six 
months." (emphasis added) 
Page 77 Lines 7-24 
"She was always very determined to give the baby up. She said 
that there was no way that she could support it, that she wanted 
to get on with her life. And at that time she was very 
interested in doing some modeling. And she did not have any—she 
felt that she did not have a—her words were that she was not 
stable—stably established enough to take that baby. And there 
is just—she wanted what was best for the baby, she kept saying 
that. And she even said in the hospital that she felt that she 
was doing this for somebody else, that it was the greatest thing 
that she had ever done in her life, and that it made her feel 
very good about herself. That's why this was such a surprise to 
me, because she maintained—the relationship with me and Lizanne, 
clear up until she decided to get that baby back, was very 
strongly that she did not want that baby and it was very strong 
with every witness involved. She never once even suggested that 
she keep the baby." 
Page 78 Lines 13-25, and Pages 79 - 81 
"All right. Yes. When she gave birth to the baby in the 
hospital and she—I watched her hold that baby, it occurred to me 
very strongly that maybe she would want to keep it. And in my 
mind I felt that she needed every option to keep it if there was 
any inclination toward it at all. I asked her in the hospital 
how she felt about it now that the baby as born and she was 
holding it. And she did not want to keep it. Then when we were 
at the airport— (Question) Was anyone present, a nurse or 
anyone, at this time? "Allison Robinson was there and was part 
of the conversation". "Yes, when we went to the airport, and 
she was holding the baby, waiting for her flight. (They were not 
flying back to Utah, together, as stated in LeGene Lyman's 
January 5, 1994 Affidavit. Polly and her baby flew back with 
Lizanne) This is her holding the baby. And by the way, there 
were a whole lot of those. Lizanne has the rest of them. There 
is one right there. As she held that baby, she didn't cry, but 
she held the baby. And I said to Lizanne, and so did Allison—we 
were both discussing with her that it is not too late to keep 
that baby because it has not been delivered yet. This Polly and 
her baby, by the way (indicating). That baby is little older, as 
you will see. At the airport I pointed out to Lizanne that she 
and Polly could get an apartment together and raise their babies 
together because here were two young, unwed mothers with their 
babies. And I assured her that we would help her every way 
possible if she wanted to do that. I even offered to hire her to 
do some teaching for me or to teach along with me. And she 
wasn't interested in doing that. And there were witnesses to 
that." ",,.We were all sitting there together and AlHson 
Robinson said. You don't even need to leave Texas. If you would 
stay here, keep your baby and be a nanny for Val and I, we will 
employ you and you can be the nanny to little Brian because she 
had this little boy. And Lizanne was not interested." (emphasis 
added) "When she lived with me for two-and-a-half months after 
the baby was born I asked her many times how she felt about it, 
and she kept saying she felt that she had done the best service 
she had ever done in her life." 
LIZANNE ENGEMANN WAS SATISFIED TO NOT KEEP THE BABY 
(At the time of birth, Pat Brian had told Lizanne, on the 
telephone, not to hold the baby.) 
Page 82 Lines 6-14 
"...Lizanne told me that Pat Brian had told her, Don't ever hold 
that baby because you will bond to it and it will be hard to give 
it away. And it was very upsetting to Lizanne because she was so 
determined to see the baby and hold the baby, and then she was 
equally determined to go ahead and give it away. But it made her 
very upset with Pat Brian." (This might be why she was so made 
at Pat Brian, This and maybe his tardiness in sending her money) 
Page 39 Lines 10-19 
"I knew she was very emotional on the way—on the trip down 
there. I knew that she had her ups and downs, but given the fact 
that—any young girl that's going to have a baby, that's 
unmarried and that's being moved away from her family, I 
attributed that to the pregnancy because it's hard to really 
formulate an opinion, a permanent opinion, of a person that 
fast..." 
Page 66 Lines 7-16 
(Question) You just mentioned about Polly's pregnancy being a 
little ahead of Lizanne's. I just said: Were they traveling or 
being involved with each other in the same social group during 
this period of time? "Not at all. Not at all. They didn't run 
together. (Q) So there would be no relationship to their 
separate pregnancies occurring somewhat in the same period of 
time? "No." 
Page 70 Lines 24-25+ 
"Oh, very definitely because I was not dealing with him (Steven 
Davis) directly and I really didn't want to because I think—I 
have a daughter that has two adoptive children that she got 
through social services, and I just think there is a distance 
there that's healthy." 
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08/20/90 *NOTICE OF APPEARANCE PLS 
*JOINDER IN REQUESTS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT LLP 
08/27/90 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE PLS 
09/07/90 *ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO TEMPORARILY SEAL FILE KMJ 
09/17/90 *STIPULATION DJA 
09/20/90 *MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT PLS 
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09/2 6/90 •ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION AMEND COMPLAINT RLB 
•SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT RLB 
09/28/90 •NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF PAT B BRIAN PLS 
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10/30/90 •STIPULATION VTF 
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•AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION VTF 
11/19/90 •ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT- CHRIS L SCHMUTZ PLS 
•ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT- NIELSEN & SENIOR PLS 
11/20/90 •ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT- PAT B BRIAN PLS 
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NEILSON & SENIOR'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTF FOR PROD OF DOC KMJ 
12/24/90 •CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE PLS 
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MOTION FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME VTF 
*REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT OF DEF NEILSEN & SENIOR'S MOTION FOR VTF 
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*MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT VTF 
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FIFTH DISTRICT ATTN: JUDGE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSON KMJ 
*DEF'S EXPERT WITNESS LIST VTF 
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TO PLTS7 MOT FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME RLE 
*JOINDER IN MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT VTF 
•MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY PLS 
JUDGMENT PLS 
•AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER L JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO DEFS MOTION PLS 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLS 
•AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES A JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO DEFS MOTION FOR PLS 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLS 
•SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO DEFS PLS 
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER PLS 
•••ALL OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENTS BACK TO 11/18/91 MAILED TO KMJ 
JUDGE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSON KMJ 
•MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLS 
•MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PLS 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLS 
•AFFIDAVIT OF PAT B BRIAN PLS 
•JOINDER IN MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLS 
•••ALL DOCUMENTS FILED 12/9/91 MAILED TO JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSON KMJ 
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TRJ scheduled for 2/18/92 at 10:00 A in room ? with ??? KM: 
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TEN PAGES KMJ 
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•REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT KMJ 
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FRIDAY FEBRUARY 18, 1994 
11:12 AM 
Filing Date: 06/22/90 
Judge: 
JAMES, JENNIFER, & CHILD JOHNSON (ASSUMED NAMES) VS NIELSEN & SENIOR 
01/29/92 
02/03/92 
02/04/92 
02/05/92 
02/10/92 
02/12/92 
02/18/92 
02/19/92 
02/24/92 
02/25/92 
02/28/92 
03/04/92 
03/09/92 
03/11/92 
03/19/92 
03/23/92 
03/24/92 
03/25/92 
03/27/92 
04/01/92 
04/03/92 
*PLTS' ANSWER TO DEF PAT BRIAN'S COUNTERCLAIM VTF 
*ORDER CLJ 
*ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE COUNTERCLAIM VTF 
•COUNTERCLAIM (PAID FOR ON 10/17/91) VTF 
•SUBPOENA ON RETURN RLB 
TRJ rescheduled to 5/ 4/92 at 10:00 A in room ? with ??? KMJ 
•MINUTE ENTRY - TRIAL SET FOR 5-4-92 THROUGH 5-15-92, TWO WEEK KMJ 
JURY TRIAL IN COURTROOM 202 WITH JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSON KMJ 
•FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RLB 
•ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RLB 
•DEPOSITION LETTERS (2) VTF 
•MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL VTF 
•ORDER RLB 
•OBJECTIONS TO THE PRETRIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF KMJ 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE KMJ 
•MOTION FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME KMJ 
•AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHER KMJ 
•OBJECTIONS TO ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND KMJ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY DEF KMJ 
•PARTIAL NUMMARY JUDGMENT & ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE RLB 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE RLB 
(DOCUMENTS FILED ON 24TH MAILED TO JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSON) KMJ 
•MOTION TO AMEND OR SET ASIDE THE SCHEDULING ORDER KMJ 
•MEMO OF PTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION KMJ 
TO SET ASIDE THE SCHEDULING ORDER KMJ 
•AFFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHER KMJ 
•NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION KMJ 
(ABOVE DOCUMENTS MAILED TO JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSON) KMJ 
•AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS L SCHMUTZ VTF 
•OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME VTF 
•SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN VTF 
•OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME NAH 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE NAH 
•MEMORANDUM DECISION NAH 
•AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS L SCHMUTZ NAH 
•LETTER NAH 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (2) NAH 
•NOTICE OF TAKING OF RECORDS DEPOSTION RLB 
•NOTICE OF TAKING OF DEPOSITION LIZANNE ENGEMAN MAGELBY NAH 
•NOTICE OF TAKING OF RECORDS DEPOSITION NAH 
•ORDER NAH 
•LETTER NAH 
•SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN NAH 
•MOTION TO QUASH NAH 
•SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN (2) NAH 
•MOTION OF DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND NAH 
TO QUASH PLAINTIFFS' SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM NAH 
•MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S MOTION NAH 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO QUASH PLAINTIFFS' SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM NAH 
4TH D1STKKJT LUUKI - F K U V U 
Case : 900400460 CN Contracts 
Case T i t l e : 
i. i \ x u n i 
11:12 AM 
Filing Date: 06/22/90 
Judge: 
JAMES, JENNIFER, & CHILD JOHNSON (ASSUMED NAMES) VS NIELSEN & SENIOR 
04/03/92 
04/07/92 
04/27/92 
04/30/92 
05/05/92 
05/07/92 
05/14/92 
05/18/92 
05/20/92 
05/27/92 
05/28/92 
06/12/92 
06/24/92 
07/20/92 
07/23/92 
08/24/92 
09/08/92 
09/11/92 
10/07/92 
•NOTICE OF HEARING 
*FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
*ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
*NOTICE - TRIAL CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE - PLAINTIFF TO FILE 
MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
TRJ on 5/ 4/92 was cancelled 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE HAND DELIVERY 
•PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
•NOTICE OF TAKING RECORDS DEPOSITION 
•MOTION FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
•MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY 
•MEMO OF POINTS AND AUTHOR IN SUPPORT OF PLTS' MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE SCHEDULING ORDER 
•AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHER 
•AFFIDAVIT OF SYLVIA BUNDRANT 
•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
•ORDER EXTENDING DISCOVERY CUT-OFF 
•ORDER OF DISMISSAL - DEF CHRIS L SCHMUTZ ONLY 
•ORDER FOR AN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME (3) 
•AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
•ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S MOTION FOR PROTEC-
TIVE ORDER 
•NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF L BRENT HOGGAN 
•SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM VALLEY BANK & TRUST ON RETURN 
•DEF NIELSEN & SENIOR'S MEMO IN RESPONSE TO PLTS' MOTION TO 
EXTEND DISCOVERY 
•NOTTCE FROM SUPREME COURT—PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
DENIED 
•MEMORANDUM DECISION - MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY DENIED 
•NOTTCE OF DEPOSITION OF LIZANNE ENGEMANN MAGLEBY 
•SU13POENA DUCES TECUM ON RETURN 
•OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
•ORDER DENYING MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY 
•ORDER (DEPO OF L MAGLEBY ALLOWED AND MONITOR MAY BE PRESENT) 
•COPY OF LETTER RE DEPO OF L MAGLEBY TO ATTY L WHYTE 
•FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
•ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
•MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
FISHER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW •AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C 
AS COUNSEL 
10/21/92 •MEMO OF POINTS & AUTH IN OPPOS TO MOT OF PLTS' COUNSEL TO 
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
•NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
•REPLY TO DEF'S OPPOSITION TO MOT TO WITHDRAW 
•AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHER IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO DEF'S OPPOS 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
•NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
•MEMORANDUM DECISION (MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL GRANTED) 
10/27/92 
11/05/92 
11/20/92 
11/23/92 
PLS 
PLS 
PLS 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
NAH 
PLS 
PLS 
NAH 
PLS 
VTF 
VTF 
VTF 
VTF 
VTF 
NAH 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
KMJ 
VTF 
VTF 
VTF 
CLJ 
CLJ 
KMJ 
VTF 
NAH 
KMJ 
VTF 
KMJ 
KMJ 
VTF 
VTF 
LDD 
LDD 
LDD 
RLB 
RLB 
RLB 
RLB 
RLB 
RLB 
NAH 
NAH 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
Case : 900400460 CN Contracts 
Case Title: 
FRIDAY FEBRUARY 18, 1994 
11:12 AM 
Filing Date: 06/22/90 
Judge: 
JAMES, JENNIFER, & CHILD JOHNSON (ASSUMED NAMES) VS NIELSEN & SENIOR 
11/23/92 *MEMO OF PTS AND AUTH IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF PLTS' COUNSEL KMJ 
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL KMJ 
12/23/92 *NOTICE OF APPEARANCE (R COXSON FOR PLA) NAH 
01/21/93 *ORDER GRANTING MOT TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL RLB 
02/05/93 *DEFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT KMJ 
•MEMO OF PTS AND AUTH IN SUPPORT OF DEF'S MTN TO DISMISS KMJ 
PLAINTIFFS' SECONDED AMENDED COMPLAINT KMJ 
02/08/93 •JOTNDER OF DEF PAT B BRIAN IN MOT TO DISMISS PLTS' COMP & RLB 
CONDITIONAL MOT TO DISMISS CUNTERCLAIM RLB 
02/19/93 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS RLB 
*MEMO IN OPPOS TO MOT TO DISMISS RLB 
02/22/93 •MOTION TO STRIKE DEFS' MOT TO DISMISS RLB 
*MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOT TO STRIKE DEFS' MOT TO DISMISS RLB 
03/01/93 *OB,T TO REQ FOR ADMISS, MOT FOR PROTECT ORDER & MOT FOR SANCTION RLB 
*MrriO OF POINTS & AUTH IN SUPP OF DEFS' OBJ TO PLT'S REQ & MOT RLB 
FOR PROTECT ORDER & FOR SANCTIONS RLB 
*DEFS' MEMO IN OPPOS TO PLTS' MOT TO STRIKIE & IN SUPP OF DEFS' RLB 
REO FOR SANCTIONS RLB 
•DLLS' REPLY TO PLTS' MEMO IN OPPOS TO DEFS' MOT TO DISMISS RLB 
OPAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED RLB 
•NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION RLB 
•FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RLB 
•JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL RLB 
Case judgment is Trial Judgment RLB 
Casp disposition is Dismissed RLB 
•UNSIGNED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW KMJ 
•UNSIGNED JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL KMJ 
(JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSON WAS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE AND HE ADVISED KMJ 
TO ENTER PLAS' FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AS UNSIGNED AS HE HAS KMJ 
A1,READY SIGNED THE JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY THE DEFS) KMJ 
•Nn'TCE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT KMJ 
•MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59 NAH 
• Ml.no TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59 NAH 
•NOTTCE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (A NIELSEN FOR DEFS) VTF 
•OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHER VTF 
•MEMO OF DEF NEILSEN & SENIOR IN OPPOSITION TO PLTS' MOTION VTF 
FOR NEW TRIAL VTF 
•AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L WHYTE VTF 
05/10/93 •AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES A JOHNSON RLB 
05/13/93 •NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION NAH 
•AFFIDAVIT OF DARWIN C FISHHER KMJ 
•RH"LY MEMORANDUM KMJ 
•OBJECTION OF DEF BRIAN TO PLTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND VTF 
MOT TOM TO STRIKE VTF 
•MEMO OF POINTS AND AUTHOR IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION pF DEF BRIAN VTF 
TO PLTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION TO STRIKE VTF 
05/24/93 •MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT PAT LLP 
B BRIAN LLP 
•AFFIDAVIT OF ANNALYSE DOUGLAS LLP 
03/03/93 
04/06/93 
04/07/93 
04/12/93 
04/16/93 
05/03/93 
Case : 900400460 CN Contracts 
Case Title: 
11:12 AM 
Filing Date: 06/22/90 
Judge: 
JAMES, JENNIFER, & CHILD JOHNSON (ASSUMED NAMES) VS NIELSEN & SENIOR 
)5/24/93 
)5/26/93 
)5/28/93 
)6/04/93 
)6/ll/93 
)6/16/93 
)6/18/93 
36/21/93 
36/25/93 
36/29/93 
37/07/93 
07/16/93 
07/19/93 
07/21/93 
08/13/93 
10/08/93 
11/16/93 
11/19/93 
12/08/93 
OF DEFENDANT BRIAN 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
•AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
•MEMORANDUM DECISION 
•REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION 
Tn TT.AINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
•AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL L DOWDLE 
•AFFIDAVIT OF MARILYNN P FINESHRIBER 
•AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L WHYTE 
•MODIFTED MEMORANDUM DECISION 
•LETTER- MARILYNN P FINESHRIBER 
•ORDER (MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DENIED) 
•ORDER (MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DENIED) 
•NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 
•ORDER DENYING AND DISMISSING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59 
•LETTER TO COURT FROM ATTY MICHAEL DOWDLE 
931150075 Notice of appeal fee 160.00 
•NOTICE OF APPEAL 
•MOTION FOR BOND ON APPEAL 
93.1150078 Civil bond posted ========> check 300.00 
Posted by: RICHARD C COXSON 
275 NORTH MAIN 
SPANISH FORK UT 84660 
$3 00 COST BOND 
•ORDER FOR BOND ON APPEAL 
•NOTICE FROM SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL FILED—THEIR #930340 
•TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (JULY 12, 1991) 
•CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS REQUESTED 
•LETTER 
•CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY TO TEMPORARILY WITHDRAW RECORD OF CASE 
Or' *.^ PEAL - OUT TO COXSON 
•INDEX AND CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - COPY SENT TO SUPREME COURT 
•IT. < !'!•,!< FROM SUPREME COURT - CASE POURED-OVER TO COURT OF 
Af:'EM,S 
*irnrnT,n F R 0 M COURT OF APPEALS - THEIR NO. 930716-CA 
TO TEMP. WITHDRAW RECORD OF CASE ON APPEAL - IN •Ci.; • ! . OF ATTY 
FROM COXSON 
12/15/9 3 •REQUEST FOR RECORD 
•CERT. OF ATTY. TO TEMP. WITHDRAW 
TO JUSTIN SHAW (7 GREEN FILES, 1 
01/21/94 •CERT. OF ATTY. TO TEMP. WITHDRAW 
FROri JUSTIN SHAW 
02/11/94 •ORDER FROM COURT OF APPEALS 
Pr: -n MTTH DEPOSITIONS 
RECORD OF CASE 
TRANSCRIPT) 
RECORD OF CASE 
ON APPEAL - OUT 
ON APPEAL - IN 
GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
LLP 
NAH 
NAH 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
SGJ 
CLJ 
C U 
CLJ 
CLJ 
CLJ 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
CMP 
End of the r'or'ret report for this case. 
